Tammy Degrauwe vs. Thomas Vincent Dispenza : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Tammy Degrauwe vs. Thomas Vincent Dispenza :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lowell V. Summerhays; Adamson and Summerhays.
W. Andrew McCullough; McCullough, Jones and Ivins.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Tammy Degrauwe v. Thomas Vincent Dispenza, No. 930144 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5016
UTAH COUKT OF APPEALS 
UTAH 
COCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.Ate ^^>D!4~4-DOCKET NO. —!—i i -L-L- i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
TAMMY DEGRAUWE, : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
THOMAS VINCENT DISPENZA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
000O000 
Appeal from a Decree of the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
Case No. 930144-CA 
Priority No. 4 
Lowell V. Summerhays (3154) 
Adamson & Summerhays 
6400 Commerce Park 
448 East 6400 South, #314 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801) 262-4495 
Attorney for Appellant 
W. Andrew McCullough (2170) 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
930 South State, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 224-2119 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 2 8 1993 
• / • MaryT. Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 6 
POINT I DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY THE STIPULATION HE 
ENTERED REGARDING CUSTODY BECAUSE HE DID 
NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO RELIEVE 
HIMSELF FROM IT 7 
POINT II ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS SHOULD BE TAXED 
AGAINST THE APPELLANT AS WELL AS FURTHER 
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO RULES 33, 34 AND 40 
OF UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Elmer v. Elmer 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989) 11 
Hialev v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984) 9 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987) 2, 10 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990). . . . 1, 9 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) 12 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 
(Utah App. 1989) 13 
Wurst v. Department of Employment Sec., 818 P.2d 1036 
(Utah App. 1991) 11 
STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
Page 
Section 78-2A-3 (2 ) (i) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 1 
Rule 33(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 2, 12 
Rule 34 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 2, 12 
Rule 40(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 2, 12, 13 
Rule 11 U.R.C.P 13 
Rule 52 U.R.C.P 10 
Rule 59 U.R.C.P 10 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P 2, 10 
Rule 4-504 Utah Code of Judicial Administration . . . . 3, 5-6, 10 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
TAMMY DEGRAUWE, : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : 
vs. : Case No. 930144-CA 
THOMAS VINCENT DISPENZA, : Priority No. 4 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
000O000 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal of a judgment rendered in the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County. The Decree of the District Court 
granted custody of the minor child of the parties to Plaintiff. 
Jurisdiction is conveyed on this Court to hear appeals from the 
final judgment of District Courts in domestic matters by § 78-2A-
3(2)(i) U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
(a) Whether the stipulation entered into between the parties 
on August 4, 1993, in open court was binding on Defendant. This is 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 
1 
^Q^ P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990). 
(b) Whether Defendant has waived any right to seek his relief 
by appeal, by failing to take appropriate steps in the trial court. 
There is no "standard < review" this question, as th i s Court i s 
prohibited from reviewing it by the waiver. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 
P.2d 938 (Utah 1987) . 
i \ 1 h e t h e r this :i s e L f rivolous appeal for w h i c h a ci ci i t i o i I a J 
costs and attorney's fees should be taxed against Appellant. This 
is a question of law to be determined by the Court's discretion, 
pursuai; the U t a 1: R/i i J es of Appel ] ate 
Procedure. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. Relief from judgment or order. 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence 
could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) 
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is no longer equitable that 
2 
the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), 
(2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspsend 
its operation. This rule does not limit the power 
of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, 
or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file 
with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and 
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections 
shall be submitted to the court and counsel within 
five days after service. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action to determine paternity and custody of a 
minor child. The parties stipulated to paternity and proceeded 
towards trial on the issues of custody and visitation. A 
scheduling hearing took place before Hon. John A. Rokich, the trial 
judge, on May 18, 1992, and a scheduling order was made on that day 
3 
(R.97). Witness lists, including expert witnesses, were to be 
exchanged by June 15, 1992. Plaintiff filed her witness list on 
June 12, 1992 (R.107). A final pretrial was held on July 28, 1992, 
and it was determined that trial should go forward on August 4, 
1992, as previously ordered. At the time set for trial, the 
parties were present, as were several witnesses. The parties, 
prior to the commencement of the formal trial, however, were called 
into the court's chambers, and, after a substantial discussion, a 
settlement was reached. The stipulation was simple: it called for 
custody to be granted to Plaintiff, reasonable visitation to 
Defendant, and a review of the situation in 90 days by the Court. 
A copy of that stipulation is made part of the Addendum. The 
Stipulation was, of course, intended to take the place of a trial. 
Plaintiff had a large number of witnesses present in court, several 
of whom were under subpoena, and not anxious to be there. There is 
nothing in the stipulation to suggest that the stipulation itself 
was anything other than a final decision on the case, with rough 
spots to be worked out on the 90-day review. The Court requested 
Defendant's counsel, Mr. Summerhays, to prepare an order and to 
present it to Plaintiff's counsel for approval, prior to entry 
(R.251). On October 15, 1992, some two months after the 
stipulation and hearing, Mr. Summerhays did present an order to the 
Court for signature, without sending it to Plaintiff's counsel for 
4 
approval, and without submitting it for review by Plaintifffs 
counsel pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. (See pages R.190-191, and note lack of approval as 
to form, or certificate of service, as required by the rules). The 
order, inadvertently signed by the Court, purported to be a "90-day 
interim order" in which Plaintiff "shall have temporary custody" of 
the minor child. Immediately upon being advised of the entry of 
such an order, Plaintiff moved to set it aside (R.192-193). This 
was done on the grounds that the order did not accurately reflect 
the stipulation of the parties and the order of the Court thereon. 
A review hearing was scheduled for November 30, 1992. At that 
hearing, the Court entered an order setting aside the erroneously 
signed order of October 15, 1992 and reaffirmed its original 
intent: 
And the order will be that the Plaintiff is awarded 
custody of the child who's the subject matter of these 
proceedings, and that the visitation schedule would be 
that adopted by the Third Judicial District Court. 
(R.254). 
A conversation took place between the attorneys and the Court 
over the terms of the order, and over concerns by both parties of 
the visitation problems which had taken place during the previous 
90 days or so. No objection was put on the record regarding the 
Court's ruling. Defendant's counsel did, however, go on record 
explaining to his client that the order of custody was indeed 
5 
final: 
What he means, Tom, is that that last stipulation was not 
a temporary 60-day stipulation. It was a permanent 
resolution of custody. That's what he ruled today. And 
he has ruled you're going to get the child as per the 
schedule, which is every other weekend and every other 
Wednesday. That's what has been his ruling today. Mr. 
McCullough is going to provide that. (R.265). 
The final order and decree was drafted by Plaintiff's counsel, 
was submitted to Defendant's counsel pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration, and was signed and entered by the 
Court on February 5, 1993, there being no objections to the order 
filed (R.227-232). Defendant, without filing any motions or 
requests for relief with the District Court, filed an appeal, on 
March 4, 1993. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant entered into a stipulation regarding custody and 
visitation in open court on August 4, 1993. He is bound by the 
stipulation. 
Defendant, in attempting to be relieved from a stipulation 
entered into by "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect," must have made a motion to set aside the order in the 
trial court, and cannot use this Court to obtain such a remedy. 
This appeal is frivolous, and extra costs and attorney's fees 
should be assessed pursuant to the rules of this Court. 
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POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY THE STIPULATION HE ENTERED 
REGARDING CUSTODY BECAUSE HE DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE 
ACTION TO RELIEVE HIMSELF FROM IT. 
This is a matter that was resolved prior to trial by 
stipulation. The stipulation was made to resolve the disputes 
between the parties; not to postpone them for 90 days. The parties 
knew that is what they were doing in August; and so did the Court. 
Defendant has later claimed that either he did not understand the 
stipulation or, because of perceived troubles with it, he felt he 
should not be bound by it. What he is basically doing by filing 
this appeal is asking this Court to set aside that stipulation and 
to allow him to present his case during a trial. He presents no 
authority that suggests that he has this right. 
Defendant has made a major point in his brief of the fact that 
the court set the matter for "review" in 90 days. Defendant 
apparently takes the view that it was Defendant, not the Court, who 
was going to review the matter in 90 days. No promises were made 
as to the scope of that review; and certainly the parties did not 
reserve the right to decide that they were dissatisfied, and to go 
forward to trial. Plaintiff had gone to substantial trouble and 
expense to bring in several witnesses in August. If trial were to 
be held, this was the time for it. She would have never agreed to 
a continuance, if that is what was really granted. In fact, 
7 
Defendant filed a motion for a continuance on July 23, 1992, 
(R.161) which the Court denied at pretrial on July 28 (R.170). 
Plaintiff already had been awarded temporary custody of the child 
by the Domestic Commissioner (R.66-72). She was not in court 
seeking more temporary orders; and she was not there to stipulate 
to the continuance that she had opposed (R.131-135) just the week 
before. 
The trial Court has the inherent power to review its own 
rulings, should it reserve that power in its original ruling. The 
scope of that review however, is the exclusive province of the 
Court that reserved it. The Court here was concerned about 
perceived problems that might crop up over visitation. It wanted 
to deal with those problems before they got out of hand. The 
problems were discussed at the review; and the Court issued a stern 
warning to the parties about following the orders of the Court 
(R.255-256). The Court did its job, as there have been no reported 
violations of the orders of the Court regarding visitation, since 
that warning was issued. 
The Court did indeed review its earlier ruling and stated: 
"The order remains the same except that there are some 
clarifications," (R.265). If Defendant expected that he had the 
right to insist on more, there was simply no basis for him to 
believe that. Defendant freely entered into the stipulation in 
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open Court, and was represented by counsel in doing so. His own 
counsel read the stipulation into the record. Everyone knew that 
this disposed of the case; and so it did. Because Defendant now 
has had second thoughts, he is attempting to repudiate the 
agreement. He cannot do so. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the "well-settled rule with 
respect to stipulations" in the case of Higley v. McDonald, 685 
P.2d 496 (Utah 1984). The rule is that stipulations "are 
conclusive and binding on the parties unless, upon timely notice 
and for good cause shown, relief is granted therefrom." 685 P.2d 
at 499. That rule was discussed by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
the case of Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990). 
This court, after referring to the above-cited case, stated: 
The appropriate procedure to provide such notice and 
obtain relief from a judgment based on a mistakenly 
executed stipulation is to file a motion pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), seeking relief because of "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," within 
three months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered. 796 P.2d at 406. 
Defendant' s attempt to have the Court enter an order which did 
not accurately reflect the stipulation of the parties may evidence 
confusion on the part of Defendant (and perhaps his counsel) as to 
the effect of the original stipulation entered on August 4, 1993. 
The court ended any such confusion during the hearing of November 
30, 1992, and by entering Plaintiff's Order and Decree on February 
9 
5, 1993. During all this time, both at the November 30 hearing, 
and thereafter, Defendant did nothing to bring his purported 
confusion and/or his objections to the Court's ruling on the 
stipulation to the attention of the Court. He did not state 
objections to the Court's ruling at the hearing; and did not argue 
that he had not intended to enter into a permanent stipulation. He 
did not file objections to the order and decree pursuant to rule 4-
504 of the Code of Judicial Administration. He did not request new 
findings or a new trial pursuant to Rules 52 and 5 9 U.R.C.P.; and 
he did not ask the Court to set aside the stipulation pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., the remedy set forth by this Court in such a 
situation. By refusing to do any of those things, he did not give 
the trial court an opportunity to correct any mistake it may have 
allegedly made regarding the effect of the original stipulation. 
This Court is not the appropriate place to make the argument 
for the first time that the lower court erred in interpreting and 
implementing the stipulation of the parties. The trial court could 
have, in its discretion, held a hearing and taken testimony as to 
the reasons why Defendant wanted to set aside the stipulation. 
There were many remedies available to the trial court, which are 
not available here. Defendant's failure to ask the trial court for 
relief is fatal to his claims. The Utah Supreme Court, in Mascaro 
v. Davis, 741 P. 2d 938 (Utah 1987) restated a fundamental principle 
10 
of the law: 
We have held that matters not raised at the trial court 
level will not be considered by this Court on appeal, 
particularly when the problem could have been resolved 
below. 741 P.2d at 944. 
This Court reiterated the rule in the case of Wurst v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 818 P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1991), and 
said simply ". . . it is well settled that this Court will not 
address an issue raised for the first time on appeal." 818 P.2d at 
1039. 
The issue in this case is not, as Defendant would claim, 
whether or not he was granted his constitutional right to have his 
day in Court. It is whether he is bound by his stipulation, when 
he made no attempt to be relieved of it. The law is clear that he 
is so bound. 
Defendant, of course, still has his remedy. Any decree 
involving custody can be modified for changed circumstances. The 
Supreme Court has even made it easier to change custody if the 
original custody decree was arrived at by stipulation. (See Elmer 
v. Elmer 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989). He cannot review the custody 
decision as he has attempted to do in this appeal. 
11 
POINT II 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS SHOULD BE TAXED AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT AS WELL AS FURTHER SANCTIONS PURSUANT 
TO RULES 33, 34 AND 40 OF UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
Pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Appellee requests attorney's fees and double costs 
on the basis that this is a frivolous appeal. 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure reads in 
relevant part: 
If the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, 
it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable 
attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may 
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
In Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988), this Court 
ruled that sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal when: 
. . . an appeal is obviously without any merit and has 
been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, 
and results in delayed implementation of the judgment of 
the lower court; increased cost of litigation; and 
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law Court. 
752 P.2d at 369. 
The facts and circumstances of the instant case merit the 
awarding of double costs and attorney's fees for a frivolous 
appeal. The appeal was taken without any attempt to properly 
identify the issues or to take appropriate remedies in the trial 
court. Failure to do even basic research on the availability of 
12 
remedies and the appropriate procedure to obtain them is ground for 
sanctions. The instant case is without reasonable legal or factual 
basis and is without any merit. This matter should be remanded to 
the trial court for the sole purpose of determining the full amount 
of costs and attorney's fees. 
If the court deems it appropriate, additional sanctions may be 
in order pursuant to Rule 40 for bringing a frivolous appeal. Rule 
40(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure imposes a similar duty on 
litigants and their counsel as does Rule 11 of U.R.C.P. Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should summarily affirm the judgment and decree of 
the trial court. Additionally, because this is a frivolous appeal 
without merit, costs and attorney's fees should be assessed as 
appropriate within the discretion of this Court. 
DATED this /?4^ day of Vj 4+%*^ ' 1993-
MCCUL0OUGH, JONES & IVINS 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ / day of July, 1993, I did 
mail two true and correct copies of the Brief of Appellee, postage 
prepaid to Lowell V. Summerhays, Attorney for Appellant, 6400 
Commerce Park, 448 East 6400 South, #314, Murray, Utah 84107. 
U'QUftL c^4-
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ADDENDUM 
1 s**un 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NO. 910901456 
TAMMY DEGRAUWE, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. 
THOMAS VINCENT DISPENZA, 
DEFENDANT. 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ROKICH, JUDGE 
AUGUST 4, 1992 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVANS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
930 SOUTH STATE STREET 
OREM, UT 84058 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
COMMERCE PLAZA 
448 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
MURRAY, UT 8410 7 
FILE! 
MAY 0 3 1993 
»v 
COURT OF APPEALS 
FH.E9 0SST8HSTCQU3T 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 8 1992 
Deputy Cterk 
00244 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1992; A.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: THIS IS TAMMY DEGRAUWE VERSUS 
4 THOMAS VINCENT DISPENZA, 910901456. 
5 MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS 
6 PRESENT REPRESENTED BY MR. MCCULLOUGH, THE DEFENDANT IS 
7 PRESENT REPRESENTED BY MR. SUMMERHAYS. 
8 MR. SUMMERHAYS: LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS, I 
9 MIGHT ADD. 
10 THE COURT: OKAY. THE COURT HAS BEEN ADVISED 
11 THAT THE PARTIES HAVE REACHED A STIPULATION. WHO WILL 
12 READ THE STIPULATION INTO THE RECORD? 
13 MR. SUMMERHAYS: I'LL GIVE IT A FIRST TRY, 
14 YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY. 
15 THE COURT: YOU MAY DO SO. 
16 MR. SUMMERHAYS: THIS STIPULATION WILL 
17 PREVAIL AND ABIDE UNTIL 90 DAYS FROM THIS DATE, AT 
18 WHICH TIME, OR THERE ABOUTS, WE WILL BE GIVEN A DATE BY 
19 THE CLERK FOR AN AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY THE COURT, WHICH 
20 IS THAT HE SHALL CONTINUE TO PAY A HUNDRED AND 
21 THIRTY-FOUR DOLLARS A MONTH CHILD SUPPORT. 
22 MR. DISPENZA, IN ADDITION, WILL PAY ONE HALF OF THE 
23 PREMIUM FOR A HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY WHICH THE PARTIES 
24 WILL BE ORDERED TO, AS SOON AS CONVENIENTLY POSSIBLE, 
25 TAKE OUT ON THE MINOR CHILD MICHAEL. AND MRS. DEGRAUWE 
00245 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IS ORDERED TO 
WITHIN 30 
COVERAGE. 
THE 
PAY THE OTHER ONE HALF OF THAT AMOUNT. 
COURT: LET ME ADD, THAT MUST BE DONE 
DAYS. I DON'T WANT THAT CHILD WITHOUT 
THE PLAINTIFF: OKAY. YEAH. RIGHT NOW, 
PREEXISTING CONDITIONS THEY DO NOT COVER. MICHAEL HAS 
LAZY-- WHAT IS A CROSSED EYE. ONE OF HIS EYES 
AND CROSSES. HE WAS SUPPOSED TO SEE A DOCTOR 
BUT I DIDN'T HAVE THE $65 
CAVITIES 
DOLLARS. 
AND THAT 
WANT YOU 
ON AUGUST 
FOR IT. HE HAS GOT 
IS LAZY 
ON IT, 
FOUR 
EXISTING RIGHT NOW. IT'S A HUNDRED AND NINETY 
THE 
WILL 
COURT: YOU EACH PAY HALF OF THE 
BE DONE IMMEDIATELY. WITHIN 30 
TO GET THAT CHILD'S HEALTH TAKEN CARE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
PLAINTIFF: 
DEFENDANT: 
PLAINTIFF: 
WHEN I WANT--
I HAVE THE COVERAGE, 
COST, 
DAYS I 
OF. 
JUST-- j 
HE HAS A DENTIST APPOINTMENT 
29TH TO FILL FOUR CAVITIES. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: WE'RE GOING TO WITHDRAW OUR 
OFFER, YOUR HONOR. IT KEEPS GOING FURTHER AND 
SHE'S NOT 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: JUST A MINUTE. 
MCCULLOUGH: 
DISTURBING— 
MR. 
THE 
SUMMERHAYS: 
COURT: NO, 
FURTHER. 
SHE'S GIVING INFORMATION. 
SHE WANTS THE CHILD 
IT'S NOT GOING TO GO 
BACK. 
BACK. 
0024G 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE ORDER WILL BE THAT THE CHILD WILL GO WITH THE 
FATHER UNTIL THE 29TH, RETURNED ON THE 29TH. 
YOU CAN MAKE ANOTHER APPOINTMENT FOR 
CAVITIES AND TAKE CARE OF 
THE 
THE CAVITIES, BUT EACH OF YOU 
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DENTAL OR MEDICAL EXPENSES NOT 
COVERED BY INSURANCE. 
THE PLAINTIFF: HE WILL HAVE IT WHEN 
HOME. HE ALREADY HAS A D E N T A L -
MR. MCCULLOUGH: TAMMY. 
THE COURT: THAT WILL BE TAKEN CARE 
I WANT THAT DONE WITHIN 30 
GO AHEAD. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
ALTERNATIVE WEEKENDS. HE 
6:30 ON FRIDAYS UNTIL 6:30 
THIRD DISTRICT. 
THE COURT: WHY 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
THIRD DISTRICT, AS IT'S IN 
IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
TAKE THE CHILD TO NEW YORK 
DAYS. 
WE'RE GOING TO HAVE 
WILL HAVE VISITATION 
ON SATURDAYS AS PER 
DON'T WE SPECIFY--
SIX O'CLOCK. 
WE'RE JUST ADOPTING 
HE COMES 
OF, AND 
FROM 
THE 
THE 
PLACE, VISITATION SCHEDULE 
RIGHT. 
MR. DISPENZA IS ALLOWED TO 
, TO LEAVE ON THE 14TH AND 
00247 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
RETURN ON THE 29TH. EACH PARTY IS ENJOINED FROM 
HARASSING EACH OTHER. MR. DISPENZA IS FIRMLY 
ADMONISHED TO HAVE THE CHILD BACK HERE ON THE 29TH OR 
HE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE PROCESSES OF THE LAW, 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, A CRIMINAL CHARGE. 
AND 
VOUCH FOR YOU 
WE HAVE ASSURED THE COURT THAT WE WOULD 
IN THAT REGARD AND THAT YOU WILL BE BACK 
ON THE 29TH WITH THE CHILD. 
AND 
MR. DISPENZA? 
THE 
MR. 
OH, 
THAT'S YOUR INTENTION, IS IT NOT, 
DEFENDANT: YES, IT IS. 
SUMMERHAYS: THAT'S OUR STIPULATION. 
THERE ARE TWO OTHER THINGS. 
EACH PARTY, AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WILL 
BEAR THEIR OWN ATTORNEY FEES UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE 
COURT, AND THE ISSUE OF THE CAMCORDER AND COPIES OF THE 
TAPE ARE RESERVED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THIS COURT 
OR AS A CIVIL 
THE 
JURISDICTION. 
MR. 
THE 
MICHAEL AND I 
TAPES. 
MR. 
MATTER. 
COURT: I DON'T KNOW. I HAVE NO 
MCCULLOUGH: YEAH, YEAH. I THINK--
DEFENDANT: WE TOOK A LOT OF PICTURES OF 
WOULD LIKE A SEPARATE COPY OF THOSE 
SUMMERHAYS: WHICH WE ARE WILLING TO PAY 
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4 
1 FOR* 
2 MR. MCCULLOUGH: I WILL SUGGEST TO MY CLIENT 
3 WE WORK THAT OUT. 
4 THE ONLY OTHER ITEM I THINK WE DISCUSSED WAS 
5 THAT THE COURT DID AGREE THAT IF THERE ARE VIOLATIONS 
6 OF THE ORDER, SPECIFICALLY THAT IF EITHER PARTY IS NOT 
7 WORKING OUT WITH VISITATION PROBLEMS, OR IF THERE IS 
8 HARASSMENT AS AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE COURT, THAT WE 
9 MAY BYPASS THE DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER AND COME DIRECTLY 
10 TO THIS COURT FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
11 THE COURT: THAT'S CORRECT. 
12 MR. SUMMERHAYS: THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 THE COURT: I WON'T HAVE IT DELAYED SO YOU 
14 HAVE TO WAIT 30 DAYS TO BE HEARD BY A COMMISSIONER. 
15 COME DIRECTLY TO THE COURT. WE'LL GIVE YOU THE 
16 EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE WE CAN. 
17 MR. SUMMERHAYS: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S ONE 
18 OTHER QUESTIONS MR. DISPENZA POSED. 
19 HIS SUGGESTION IS THAT THEY DROP THE CHILD 
20 OFF AT THE HOUSE SO THAT THERE AREN'T ANY 
21 COMPLICATIONS, AND THAT HER LIVE-IN BOYFRIEND NOT BE 
22 ALLOWED TO COME ON MR. DISPENZA'S PROPERTY, UNDER THOSE 
23 CIRCUMSTANCES. 
24 THE COURT: HE WON'T. THERE'S NO PROBLEM. 
25 MR. MCCULLOUGH: EACH DROP OFF WITH THE 
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OTHER. OR DOES MY CLIENT DO BOTH? 
THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU SUGGESTING? HOW DO 
YOU GET THE CHILD HOME? 
THE DEFENDANT: 
DURING THE WEEKDAY HOURS. 
UP THE BOY AS WELL AS DROE 
THE PLAINTIFF: 
THE COURT: YOU 
DELIVER AND PICK UP? 
THE PLAINTIFF: 
STAY APART, IT'S BETTER. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: 
TRANSPORTATION. 
THE PLAINTIFF: 
DOWN? 
IF SHE-- I'M JUST KEEPING HIM 
AT 9 O'CLOCK SHE COULD PICK 
» HIM OFF. 
EXCEPT WEDNESDAY. 
WANT TO PICK UP THE CHILD, 
I DON'T MIND. IF THOSE TWO 
SHE PROVIDES THE 
WHAT IF THE VEHICLE BREAKS 
THE COURT: THEN HE DELIVERS THE CHILD TO 
YOU. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: 
THE COURT: MR. 
STIPULATION READ INTO THE 
THAT STIPULATION? 
THE DEFENDANT: 
OKAY. 
DISPENZA, YOU HEARD THE 
RECORD. DO YOU CONCUR WITH 
I DO. 
THE COURT: MRS. DEGRAUWE, DO YOU CONCUR IN 
THE STIPULATION READ INTO 
THE PLAINTIFF: 
THE RECORD? 
UM-HUM. 
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6 
THE COURT: ANSWER AUDIBLY. 
THE PLAINTIFF: YES. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: MAY WE PREPARE THE ORDER? 
THE COURT: YOU PREPARE THE ORDER. I WANT 
YOU TO SUBMIT THE ORDER TO MR. MCCULLOUGH BEFORE IT'S 
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: AS TO FORM. 
THE COURT: FINE. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: THANK YOU. AND I THINK THIS 
IS A GOOD, REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. WE HOPE YOU PEOPLE 
CAN WORK THIS OUT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CHILD. 
(THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
7 00251 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, AN OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY 
THAT I REPORTED THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON AUGUST 4, 
1992, AND THE TRANSCRIPT PAGES INCLUDED HEREIN, 1 
THROUGH 7, INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID PROCEEDINGS. 
DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1992 
KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, C.S.R. 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
00252 
Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154 Third Ju. ..;,;> J^trict 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
A Legal Association _ 
Commerce Plaza "LI ID 1992 448 East 6400 South, Suite 314 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-4495 
Murray, Utah 84107 „, ^yU^f 
Deputy Citirk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
TAMMY DEGRAUWE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS DISPENZA, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER 
Civil No. 910901456CS 
Judge Rokich 
The trial in the above-entitled action was regularly held on 
the 4th day August, 1992, the Honorable Judge Rokich presiding. 
Defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, 
Lowell V. Summerhays. Plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by her attorney, Andrew McCullough. The parties having 
stipulated on the record, which stipulation was approved by Judge 
Rokich, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That plaintiff shall have temporary custody of the 
parties' minor son during the pendency of this ninety day interim 
order subject to the defendant having reasonable visitation more 
particularly set forth in the standard schedule of visitation 
presently recognized by this court and in addition to this said 
schedule of visitation, the defendant shall have visitation with 
the minor son every Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
ooi 
2. That the defendant will continue to pay child support 
payments to the plaintiff in the amount of $134.00 per month. 
3. Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the premium for 
health, dental and optical insurance. The parties will each pay 
one-half of all existing medical expenses and other expenses not 
covered under said policy of health insurance with each of the 
parties to comply within thirty days. 
4. The defendant will be allowed to take the minor child to 
New York for an uninterrupted visit, from August 13, 1992 until 
August 29, 1992. 
5. Each of the parties are hereby restrained and enjoined 
from bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming each 
other at the parties' place of residence, employment, or any other 
place. 
6. The issue of personal property may be litigated at a later 
date in a separate civil suit. 
7. Each party is to bear their own attorney's costs. 
8. This order will be reviewed ninety days from the date of 
the trial. 
9. Any violations of this order by any of the parties shall 
not come before a commissioner but come directly to the above-
entitled judge. 
DATED this /*> day of Saptombor, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
r^+L- 4 (£?Jk<L 
trudge Rokich 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
W. Andrew McCullough 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY DEGRAUWE, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. 
THOMAS VINCENT DISPENZA, 
DEFENDANTS 
NO. 910901456 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ROKICH, JUDGE 
NOVEMBER 30, 1992 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
930 SOUTH STATE STREET 
OREM, UT 84058 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: LOWELL V. SUMMERYHAYS 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
448 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
HLE0 DISTRICT G9URT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 5 1993 
SALTLAK^COUNTY MAY 0 3 1993 
By 
CQURT OF APPEALS Deputy Cterk 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; NOVEMBER 30, 1992; A.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: TAMMY DEGRAUWE VERSUS THOMAS 
VINCENT DISPENZA, 910901456. 
COUNSEL, MAKE YOUR APPEARANCES FOR THE 
RECORD, PLEASE. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: LOWELL SUMMERHAYS, YOUR 
HONOR, FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: ANDREW MCCULLOUGH FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF, TAMMY DEGRAUWE. 
THE COURT: MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THE 
PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT ARE PRESENT. 
THE COURT HAS HERETOFORE MADE A RULING WITH 
REGARD TO AN ORDER THAT WAS ENTERED ON THE 15TH OF 
OCTOBER, 1992, AND THE COURT WILL SET ASIDE THIS 
ORDER. THE ORDER WILL BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE TRANSCRIPT AND--
MR. SUMMERHAYS: COULD WE AFFIX A COPY OF THE 
TRANSCRIPT AS PART OF THE ORDER? 
THE COURT: RIGHT. AND THE ORDER WILL BE 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE CHILD 
WHO'S THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, AND THAT 
THE VISITATION SCHEDULE WOULD BE THAT ADOPTED BY THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. 
NOW, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE HAS 
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BEEN SOME PROBLEM WITH REGARDS TO VISITATION; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
THE 
THE 
ORDER THAT IF 
AND THE COURT 
DEFENDANT: YES. 
COURT: 
EITHER 
FINDS 
VISITATION SCHEDULE, 
ORDER WILL BE 
AND THE COURT IS GOING TO MAKE AN 
PARTY COMES BACK BEFORE THE COURT 
THAT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE 
THAT PARTY WHO HAS VIOLATED THE 
FORTHWITH ADMITTED TO THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL FOR TWO 
NOW, 
MR. 
WHAT 
DAYS . 
ARE THE OTHER ISSUES? 
MCCULLOUGH: YOUR HONOR, MY CLIENT HAS 
BEEN BOTH PICKING UP 
ASKS THAT THE 
COMPLAINS SHE 
COULD DO HALF 
LITTLE BETTER. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT 
DOESN' 
OF IT, 
» 
COURT: 
AND DELIVERING THE CHILD. SHE 
ORDER ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY-- HE 
T DO A VERY GOOD JOB, SO IF HE 
PERHAPS THE JOB WOULD BE DONE A 
WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY HALF? 
MCCULLOUGH: SHE PICKS UP AND DELIVERS 
THE CHILD. HE DOES 
IF HE WANTS TO PICK 
NOT PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION AT ALL. 
UP THE CHILD THEN HE WOULD KNOW, OF 
COURSE, THAT HE WOULD GET HIM ON TIME. HE'S 
COMPLAINING THAT SHE 
THE COURT: 
DOESN'T DO A GOOD JOB. 
THE ONE CONCERN, I THOUGHT THERE 
WAS AN INDIVIDUAL LIVING AT THE HOUSE THAT PRECLUDES 
HIM FROM GOING TO THE HOUSE BECAUSE THEY ALWAYS HAVE 
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1 WORDS. 
2 MR. MCCULLOUGH: HE CAN STAY IN THE 
3 BACKGROUND. I DON'T THINK--
4 THE COURT: OKAY. IF YOU GO TO THE HOUSE AND 
5 PICK UP THE CHILD, THE INDIVIDUAL WHO'S THERE IS NOT TO 
6 BE PRESENT AT THE TIME THAT HE PICKS UP THE CHILD. 
7 MR. MCCULLOUGH: YOU GOT YOUR CHOICE. IS 
8 THAT AGREEABLE? 
9 THE PLAINTIFF: HE DOESN'T HAVE TO DEAL WITH 
10 JUSTIN WHATSOEVER. 
11 THE COURT: OKAY. 
12 THE DEFENDANT: THAT'S BETWEEN ME AND HIM. 
13 THE COURT: IF JUSTIN INTERFERES OR IS IN THE 
14 ROOM WHEN HE PICKS UP THE CHILD, THAT IS GROUNDS FOR ME 
15 ENFORCING THE ORDER FOR JAIL. 
16 THE PLAINTIFF: OKAY. NOW, I HAVE SOME 
17 MEDICAL PROBLEMS. I HAVE TO BE TAKEN CARE OF ON 
18 WEDNESDAYS FOR THE NEXT COUPLE MONTHS. JUSTIN WILL--
19 BECAUSE I WILL BE IN BED ON WEDNESDAY EVENINGS HE WILL 
20 HAVE TO DELIVER AND PICK HIM UP. AND IF JUSTIN HANDS 
21 HIM OUT THE DOOR, HE'S NOT GOING TO BOTHER HIM 
22 WHATSOEVER. 
23 THE COURT: IF JUSTIN GIVES YOU ANY PROBLEM 
24 WHATSOEVER WHEN YOU PICK HIM UP, YOU NOTIFY YOUR 
25 ATTORNEY. 
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NOW, , YOU BOTH UNDERSTAND THAT SO THERE 
QUESTION IN YOUR MINDS THAT THIS IS SUPPOSED TO 
'S NO 
BE A 
PEACEFUL TRANSACTION OF PICKING UP THE CHILD. ALL 
RIGHT. 
AND 
MR. 
WHAT'S THE OTHER ISSUE? 
SUMMERHAYS: 
CLEAR, HE'S GOING TO PICK 
THE COURT: YES 
RETURN THE CHILD. 
THE 
THE 
ORDER SIGNED. 
DEFENDANT: 
WAIT A MINUTE. JUST 
THE CHILD UP? 
SO I'M 
HE'LL PICK HIM UP AND 
AS OF WHEN AND WHEN? 
COURT: AS OF THIS WEEK. JUST GET 
PUT IT THIS WAY. JUST AS SOON AS 
ORDER IS SIGNED. I WANT YOU TO SIGN AND APPROVE 
ORDER BEFORE ! 
MR. 
THE ORDER? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
HIS APPROVAL, 
THE 
ET'S SENT TO 
SUMMERHAYS: 
MCCULLOUGH: 
COURT: YOU 
MCCULLOUGH: 
COURT: AND 
TOO. 
DEFENDANT: 
AM I IN CHARGE OF PICKING 
OFF NOW? 
THE COURT: NOT 
ME. 
THE 
THE 
THE 
CAN MR. MCCULLOUGH PREPARE 
GLAD TO. 
PREPARE THE ORDER. 
FINE. 
SEND IT TO MR. SUMMERHAYS FOR 
IF I'M PICKING UP THE CHILD, 
UP THE CHILD AND DROPPING HIM 
UNTIL I GET THE ORDER SIGNED. 
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MR. MCCULLOUGH: 
WILLING TO-- HOW LONG WILL 
THE PLAINTIFF: 
SURGERY ON THE 9TH. IT'S 
BUT IT GOES, NOW WE'RE 
YOU BE I N -
WELL, ON THE 9TH 
ON AN OUTPATIENT 
THOSE TIMES WHEN I'M HAVING MEDICAL NEEDS, 
PICK 
WITH 
THE BABY UP AND DROP 
IT. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: 
SHE CAN PICK UP. SO THAT 
OF IT AND HE DOESN.'T HAVE 
THE COURT: FINE 
REGARDS TO--
MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
ANYTHING. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: 
THE COURT: OKAY 
HIM OFF, I HAVE 
I HAVE MINOR 
BASIS. ON 
IF HE COULD 
NO PROBLEM 
OTHERWISE HE CAN PICK UP AND 
SHE DOESN'T HAVE 
TO DO BOTH OF IT 
WHATEVER YOU 
WE'RE NOT ABLE 
TO DO BOTH 
• 
WORK OUT WITH 
TO WORK OUT 
WE'RE REALLY NOT. 
LOOK. THEN FOR THIS WEEK, 
IS SHE GOING TO DELIVER THE CHILD OR IS HE 
PICK UP THE CHILD? 
THE PLAINTIFF: 
HAPPENING, THERE SEEMS TO 
HAVE 
WILL 
TO WAIT ON THE STEPS. 
THE PROBLEM THAT 
GOING TO 
SEEMS TO BE 
BE A PERIOD OF TIME WHEN I 
SO IF WE DROP 
AVOID THE TEN OR FIFTEEN MINUTES THAT 
PUT ON COATS AND JACKETS WHERE WE HAVE TO 
EACH 
DROP 
OTHER, WHEN IT GETS A 
THE CHILD OFF TO EACH 
> LITTLE HOSTILE. 
OTHER, INSTEAD 
OFF, THAT 
WE HAVE TO 
DEAL WITH 
IF WE JUST 
OF PICKING UP 
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WHERE 
HIM. 
TO ME. 
YOU'RE 
THEN. 
TAMMY 
WHEN? 
WE WAIT 
THE 
THE 
THE 
FOR COATS, MITTENS AND HAT. 
COURT: OKAY. YOU DROP THE CHILD OFF TO 
PLAINTIFF: AND HE'LL DROP THE CHILD OFF 
COURT: OKAY. OTHER THAN THE TIMES 
! DOWN FOR ILLNESS, 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
DROPS OFF THE CHILD 
MR. 
9TH AND--
AND 
THE 
THE 
MCCULLOUGH: 
WHAT OTHER 
PLAINTIFF: 
SURGERY, AND THEN THAT HAPPENS 
JUST SO WE UNDERSTAND THAT, 
AND HE RETURNS THE CHILD 
ALL THE TIME EXCEPT FOR THE 
DAY? 
THEY HAVEN'T RESCHEDULED. 
COURT: EXCEPT FOR THE 9TH HE PICKS UP 
THE CHILD AT THE HOUSE, BOTH PICK UP AND RETURN. 
LEAST 
THE 
THE 
PLAINTIFF: 
1 
I'LL LET HIM KNOW. 
COURT: THEN YOU WILL THEN PROVIDE, AT 
FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE, WHAT YOUR SCHEDULE IS FOR 
SURGERY, OR YOU MIGHT SAY 
DO? 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
PLAINTIFF: 
SUMMERHAYS: 
COURT: HE 
DOWNTIME. 
WHICHEVER. OKAY. 
ON THOSE DATES WHAT DO WE 
PICKS HIM UP. 
00259 
THE PLAINTIFF: AND IF JUSTIN HAPPENS TO 
ANSWER THE DOOR-- I'LL DO MY BEST-- IN FACT HE SAW HIM 
AT THE MALL AND SAID HELLO THE OTHER DAY. HE'S TRYING 
HIS BEST. HE 
THE 
CALLING. AND 
MR. 
CAMERA IN THE 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
DELIVERS. 
THE 
THE 
KNOWS WHAT TO DO. 
DEFENDANT: IT WASN'T MY NAME HE WAS 
HE WASN'T BY HIMSELF, BY THE WAY. 
MCCULLOUGH: I'M GOING TO SET UP A VIDEO 
LIVING ROOM AND--
COURT: WHAT IS THE NEXT--
SUMMERHAYS: FIVE DAYS FROM NOW. 
COURT: WHEN SHE'S INCAPACITATED. 
SUMMERHAYS: AND THEN HE PICKS UP AND 
COURT: RIGHT, DO BOTH. 
DEFENDANT: SO THAT'S JUST DURING HER 
SURGERY, OR SOMETHING? 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. 
MCCULLOUGH: NOW, THE OTHER QUESTION WAS, 
YOUR HONOR, THAT THE COURT ORDER MR. DISPENZA TO 
PROVIDE MEDICAL INSURANCE. 
THE 
MR. 
DEFENDANT: I DO PAY— 
MCCULLOUGH: IT'S A TWO-MONTH POLICY, IS 
WHAT WE'RE SEEING RIGHT NOW AND WE'RE A LITTLE 
CONCERNED. 
THE COURT: HE HAS TO GET INSURANCE. 
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HAVEN 
BILL. 
CHILD 
OF IT 
THE DEFENDANT: UNFORTUNATELY I DID. I 
'T RECEIVED A DIME FROM HER, AND SHE'S RECEIVED MY 
THE 
SUPPORT. 
THE 
ALSO. 
THE 
MR. 
PLAINTIFF: 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: SHE 
MCCULLOUGH: 
INSURANCE POLICY. WE'RE 
BEING PERMANENT. 
THE DEFENDANT: 
CHANCE TO MAKE A PAYMENT, 
INSTEAD OF ME 
FROM 
THE 
I ASKED HIM TO TAKE IT OUT OF 
WE HAVE THE SAME EXACT COPY 
1 SHOULD PAY. 
WE'RE LOOKING AT THE 
CONCERNED ABOUT MAKING THAT 
I'M TRYING TO GIVE HER A 
IF SHE WANTS TO GET INTO IT, 
PAYING CHILD SUPPORT AND FULL INSURANCE. 
COURT: I DON'T WANT INSURANCE DEDUCTED 
THE CHILD SUPPORT. 
AND SHE MAKES 
HAVE 
HE WILL PAY THE CHILD SUPPORT 
A CHECK FOR INSURANCE, AND THAT WAY YOU 
NO PROBLEM WITH THE 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
ANYTHING, BUT-
RECEIVED FROM 
SUMMERHAYS: 
DEFENDANT: 
PLAINTIFF: 
RECORDS. 
HOW MUCH IS SHE BEHIND NOW? 
THREE AND A HALF MONTHS. 
HE HAS NEVER GIVEN ME 
-- AS OF THIS MONTH HE'S $84-- I HAVE ONLY 
HIM A TWO-AND-A-HALF OR A TWO-MONTH 
TEMPORARY POLICY THAT I REFUSE TO PAY FOR. IT'S ONLY 
MAJOR MEDICAL WE AGREED OPTICAL AND DENTAL WHICH IT 
00261 
DOES NOT COVER. WE HAVE--
THE COURT: YOU MAY NOT BE ABLE TO 
THAT'S ONE OF THE PROBLEMS. 
GET IT. 
THE DEFENDANT: HEY, HE HAS MAJOR MEDICAL AND 
IT COVERS UP TO ONE MILLION DOLLARS IN INSURANCE. THE 
PREMIUM IS A HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHT, SIXTY-
MONTH, AND I NEED HALF OF THAT FROM YOU WHICH 
IS $64. THE OTHER TWO MONTHS IS SO I CAN PAS 
INSURANCE TO GET IT GOING, AND THEN OF COURSE 
EIGHT PER 
I BELIEVE 
' FOR THE 
YOU WOULD 
MAKE THAT HALF PAYMENT TO ME OR TO THAT-- THAT'S WHY I 
GAVE YOU THAT INSURANCE TO BEGIN WITH. 
YOU TOLD ME MICHAEL HAD A PREEXISTING 
CONDITION, WHICH HE DIDN'T, AND WHEN I FILED THE 
APPLICATION HE WAS DENIED UNFORTUNATELY AND THEY 
MICHAEL DOES NOT HAVE PREEXISTING INSURANCE, 
NEW YORK LIFE HAS TAKEN MICHAEL UNDER ON THE 
THEREFORE, 
POLICY 
THAT I HAVE HERE A COPY OF IT AND I CALLED GOLDEN RULE 
AND HE'S COVERED. IF YOU DON'T WANT TO MAKE 
ON THAT, I'M GOING TO DO SO MYSELF TODAY AND 
YOU A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ORDER THAT 
JUDGE--
MR. MCCULLOUGH: LONG TERM--
MR. SUMMERHAYS: HERE'S THE ISSUE. 
ME. HERE'S THE ISSUE. 
PAYMENTS 
I'M GIVING 
' THE 
EXCUSE 
NUMBER ONE, IS IT JUST A MAJOR MEDICAL--
10 
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THE 
MR. 
HER A COPY OF 
DEFENDANT: IT COVERS--
SUMMERHAYS: NUMBER TWO, YOU WILL GIVE 
THAT POLICY. 
NUMBER THREE, HOW MUCH DO YOU CLAIM SHE OWES 
YOU FOR BACK INSURANCE PAYMENTS? 
THE DEFENDANT: TWENTY-SEVEN. PLUS TODAY 
WHEN I FILED FOR THE THREE MONTHS' PREMIUM IT'S GOING 
TO BE $64. I 
THE 
SUPPORT? 
THE 
BELIEVE THAT'S $90. 
COURT: HOW MUCH DO YOU OWE HER FOR CHILD 
DEFENDANT: I PAID HER $50 THE OTHER 
DAY. I BELIEVE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THAT I OWE HER 70. 
THE 
THIRTY-FOUR A 
PLAINTIFF: NO. I GET A HUNDRED AND 
MONTH. HE GAVE ME 50 ON WEDNESDAY. HE 
HAS ALL THE RECEIPTS. I DO SIGN A RECEIPT WITH HIM. 
HE OWES ME $84. HE ALSO OWES DR. POULSON, MIKEY'S 
DENTIST, $90. 
THE 
HERE-- LOOK, ' 
WE ALSO HAVE--
COURT: LOOK, WHAT I WANT YOU TO DO 
ZOU GO OUT IN THE JURY ROOM AND HAVE AN 
ACCOUNTING, SETTLE THAT UP, AND THEN I'LL ENTER AN 
ORDER WITH REGARDS TO THE BALANCE. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: YOUR HONOR, I APOLOGIZE, BUT 
WE G O T — WE'RE AN HOUR LATER THAN WE WERE SCHEDULED AND 
I'M LATE FOR A HEARING NOW. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: SO MAYBE HE CAN DO IT BY 
11 
00263 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MAIL. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
CHILD SUPPORT 
COURT: PREPARE THE ORDER. 
MCCULLOUGH: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
STATUTE, IF I'M CORRECT, SAYS THAT THE 
IS DUE HALF ON THE 5TH AND HALF ON THE 
20TH UNLESS THE COURT ORDERS DIFFERENTLY, AND I INTEND 
TO — 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: ALL RIGHT. HAVE THE ACCOUNTING. 
MCCULLOUGH: THE AGREEMENT IS THE 
STANDARD WHICH SAYS THAT MR. DISPENZA GETS BASICALLY 
THE SECOND HALF OF CHRISTMAS. MY CLIENT'S BIRTHDAY IS 
SHORTLY AFTER 
HAVE — 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
CHRISTMAS. SHE WONDERS IF SHE COULD 
COURT: FLIP IT AROUND. 
MCCULLOUGH: YEAH. 
COURT: JUST FLIP IT AROUND. 
PLAINTIFF: OKAY. 
COURT: THE STANDARD IS ADOPTED-
COURT: JUST TRADE DATES, THAT'S ALL. 
PLAINTIFF: THE SCHEDULE SAYS IT'S FOR 
KINDERGARTEN CHILDREN'S AGE. HE DOESN'T GO TO SCHOOL 
YET. SO WHAT I'M WONDERING IF WE COULD, IF WE CAN SET 
A DATE RIGHT NOW, PICKS THE CHILD UP AND DELIVERS HIM 
ON CHRISTMAS AT ONE O'CLOCK AND THEN WE CAN SWITCH IT 
AROUND. SO HE HAS THE BABY CHRISTMAS EVE AND MAYBE A 
12 
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DAY OR 
1 P.M. 
TWO BEFORE THAT--
THE 
MR. 
CHRISTMAS DAY 
BEFORE. 
THE 
THE FATHER AT 
DEFENDANT: I GET HIM ON CHRISTMAS DAY AT 
SUMMERHAYS: SHE SAID YOU WOULD HAVE HIM 
UNTIL 1 O'CLOCK AND ONE OR TWO DAYS 
DEFENDANT: THAT'S REAL NICE. I BECOME 
ONE TIME. NOW I'M AN OCCASIONAL 
VISITOR. THAT'S HIS LIVELIHOOD NOW. SO THAT'S WHAT MY 
SON IS 
HAVING 
LOOKING FORWARD TO, I'M SURE. 
MR. 
HIM--
THE 
I WOULD LIKE 
IS AND 
EXCEPT 
WE'RE 
THE 
THERE 
MR. 
SUMMERHAYS: WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH 
DEFENDANT: WE CAN SWITCH AROUND DAYS AND 
TO KNOW WHAT THE TOTAL OUTCOME OF ALL THIS 
TRYING TO PREPARE AN ORDER. 
COURT: THE ORDER REMAINS THE SAME 
ARE SOME CLARIFICATIONS. 
SUMMERHAYS: WHAT HE MEANS, TOM, IS THAT 
THAT LAST STIPULATION WAS NOT A TEMPORARY 60-DAY 
STIPULATION. IT WAS A PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF 
CUSTODY. THAT'S WHAT HE RULED TODAY. AND HE HAS RULED 
YOU'RE GOING TO GET THE CHILD AS PER THE SCHEDULE, 
WHICH IS EVERY OTHER WEEKEND AND EVERY OTHER 
WEDNESDAY. THAT'S WHAT HAS BEEN HIS RULING TODAY. AND 
MR. MCCULLOUGH IS GOING TO PROVIDE THAT. 
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THE DEFENDANT: 
RESOLUTION, ME TAKING MY 
SO ACCORDING TO THE 
SON TO NEW YORK AND NOT 
DISTURBING AND SO FORTH AND HAVING HIM CERTAIN DAYS, 
THERE'S NOTHING WE CAN DO 
WAIVED THAT OVER AND IT'S 
MR. 
BY THE PRIOR < 
THE 
SUMMERHAYS: 
DRDER. 
COURT: YOU 
WITH ABOUT THAT AS I'VE 
TOO BAD--
YOU SEE, THEY HAVEN'T ABIDED 
HEARD WHAT I SAID ABOUT 
ABIDING BY THE ORDER. YOU COME BACK HERE AND SHE IF 
SHE HASN'T ABIDED--
THE 
BY MALICIOUS 
COURT AT THAT 
MR. 
THAT THIS IS 
DOESN'T--
THE 
MR. 
VISITATION? 
THE 
ON OUT I HAVE 
DEFENDANT: 
PROSECUTION 
TIME AND I 
SUMMERHAYS: 
LAST WEEK I WAS INTERRUPTED 
SO I WAS NOT ENTERED INTO THE 
WOULD LIKE TO FORGET THAT. 
YOUR HONOR, ARE WE SAYING 
IN THE FUTURE, IN THE FUTURE IF SHE 
COURT: RIGHT, IF SHE DOESN'T. 
SUMMERHAYS: AND THE FAILURES TO ALLOW 
COURT: RIGHT. DO THAT. AND FROM HERE 
GIVEN YOU BOTH NOTICE, SO THERE'S NO 
QUESTION ABOUT IT. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
SOME RELIEF FOR THE FACT 
COMPLIED FOR 
YEAH. ISN'T HE ENTITLED TO 
THAT SHE REALLY HASN'T 
THE LAST COUPLE MONTHS. 
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THE PLAINTIFF: I HAVE COMPLIED. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: IF HE WANTS TO FILE AN ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE, I DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH LETTING HIM 
COME IN AND HAVING HIS DAY IN COURT AND WE'LL HAVE 
OURS. 
THE DEFENDANT: THAT'S WHAT THE-- THE 90-DAY 
REVIEW, A THOUSAND DOLLARS, TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS, TO 
GET THE LAWYERS BACK IN HERE. 
THE COURT: THAT'S MY POINT. I AM ATTEMPTING 
TO MINIMIZE YOUR COSTS. I'LL MAKE THE ORDER AND 
HENCEFORTH IF YOU DON'T GET ALONG, I'LL TAKE CARE OF IT 
BY COMING BACK HERE. ALL I COULD HAVE DONE IS SAID, 
LOOK, GO DOWNSTAIRS FIRST AND THEN COME UP HERE, COME 
UP HERE; AND I CUT THAT OUT. SO YOU'VE GOT AN ORDER 
NOW. IT WILL BE FILED. YOU ABIDE BY IT, OR ELSE. 1 
THAT'S WHAT YOU DO. 
GET YOUR FINANCES SQUARED AWAY SO THAT-- EACH 
OF YOU KNOW WHO OWES WHAT AND THE AMOUNT. GET THAT 
1 7 
DONE AND THEN ABIDE BY THE ORDER. OTHERWISE SOMEBODY 
IS GOING TO BE SPENDING TIME IN THE COUNTY JAIL. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: NOW, YOUR HONOR, 
MR. MCCULLOUGH SAID HE DOESN'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH US 
BRINGING A CONTEMPT. 
THE COURT: WHY SPEND THE MONEY ON THAT? 
WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO ACCOMPLISH? 
15 
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MR. SUMMERHAYS: WELL--
THE DEFENDANT: THE 90-DAY REVIEW. 
THE COURT: THE 90 DAYS, THAT WAS AN ORDER, 
THAT WAS NOT— 
THE DEFENDANT: TO SHOW HOW VISITATION WENT, 
AND SO FORTH. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. I FOUND THAT YOU HAVE 
PROBLEMS. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: VERY BADLY, VERY BADLY. 
THE COURT: AS A RESULT I AM IMPOSING THE 
SOME CONTEMPT PROVISIONS IN THE ORDER NOW. 
THE DEFENDANT: GOOD. 
THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU UNDERSTAND? 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I THINK WE DO. 
(THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
oo2sa 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, AN OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY 
THAT I REPORTED THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON NOVEMBER 
30, 1992 AND THAT THE PRECEDING PAGES 1 THROUGH 16, 
INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A TRUE AND CORRECT REPORTER'S 
TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID PROCEEDINGS. 
DATED THIS 20TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1993, 
KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, C.S.R. 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
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Third Judicial District 
FEB 0 5 1993 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ^"'""w 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
TAMMY DEGRAUWE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS VINCENT DISPENZA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND DECREE 
Civil No. 910901456 
(Judge Rokich) 
McCullough, Jonas, 
A Ivins 
930 South Slate St 
Suite 10 
Orem Utah 84058 
oooOooo 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before Hon. John A. 
Rokich, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on the 4th day of 
August, 1992. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by 
her attorney, W. Andrew McCullough. Defendant appeared in person 
and was represented by his attorney, Lowell V. Summerhays. 
Further proceedings were held on November 30, 1992 before Hon. 
John A. Rokich. The parties and attorneys as set forth above were 
again present. The Court, having heard the partial stipulation of 
the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE: 
1. The previous order in this matter prepared by counsel for 
1 
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Defendant and signed by the court on October 15, 1992, is hereby 
set aside. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the 
minor son of the parties subject to the standard visitation 
schedule now in effect in the Third Judicial District. A copy of 
that standard visitation schedule is attached hereto, labeled 
Exhibit "A", and by reference made a part hereof. 
3. The Court acknowledges that the minor child, Michael 
Anthony Dispenza, born April 8, 1989, is not yet of the school age 
contemplated by the reasonable visitation schedule referred to 
above. Nevertheless, the court finds that it is in the interest of 
the child and both parties that they adhere, as closely as 
possible, to the visitation schedule set forth above. It is 
further ordered, however, that the parties consider the age and 
best interests of the minor child in applying the visitation 
schedule and that they make their best efforts to be reasonable in 
that application. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded child support in the amount of 
$134.00 per month, one-half due on the 5th day of each month, and 
one-half due on the 20th day of each month. 
5. The above-referenced child support is based upon the 
Findings of the court commissioner at a temporary hearing held 
earlier in this matter that Plaintiff had a gross monthly income of 
fAcCuliough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
930 South State St 
Suite 10 
Orem Utah 84058 
00228 
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$1,505.00 per month and that Defendant had a gross monthly income 
of $1,238.00 per month. Current child support is in accordance 
with the guidelines set forth by the Utah Legislature. 
6. The parties are ordered to jointly obtain and pay for a 
policy of health and accident insurance upon the minor child, and 
to share equally all medical and dental expenses not covered by 
insurance. 
7. The parties are ordered to account for all payments of 
child support, medical insurance or medical expenses that either 
made between August 4, 1992 and November 30, 1992, and to make 
payments to each other as necessary to comply with this order, 
which shall be deemed to have been in effect as of August 4, 1992c 
8. Plaintiff shall drop off the child for visitation at the 
home of Defendant within 15 minutes of the times set forth in the 
visitation schedule attached hereto, and Defendant shall drop off 
the child at the home of Plaintiff within 15 minutes of the end of 
each visitation set forth in that schedule. The court finds, 
however, that Plaintiff may be involved in medical procedures over 
the next several months which may make it difficult for her to drop 
off the child as agreed. She may, therefore, give 5 days notice of 
a specific problem related to her physical health, and on such 
occasions that there may be such a problem, Defendant shall be 
responsible for both picking up the child and delivering the child 
McCullough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
930 South State St 
Suite 10 
Orem Utah 84058 
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before and after visitation. 
9. Visitation is to proceed as in the visitation schedule or 
as otherwise agreed between the parties. Plaintiff is specifically 
granted time with the child for her birthday, which falls shortly 
after Christmas. Defendant's Christmas visitation shall be 
exercised in advance of Christmas, rather than after Christmas, and 
will continue until 1:00 p.m. on Christmas Day. Failure to adhere 
to the visitation schedule, as may be modified between the parties, 
shall result in immediate punishment for contempt of the party 
found by the court to be at fault. Minimum contempt sanctions 
shall involve 48 hours in the Salt Lake County Jail for such 
responsible party. 
10. Each of the parties are hereby enjoined from bothering, 
harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming each other, or from 
any contact not necessary to facilitate visitation, payment of 
child support or other necessary contacts between them. 
11. Any violations of this Order by either of the parties 
shall not come before a commissioner, but shall come directly to 
the above-entitled Court, on a properly issued Order to Show Cause. 
12. Each party is to bear his or her own attorney's fees and 
court costs herein. 
McCullough, Jones, 
* Ivlns 
930 South Stale St 
Suite 10 
Orem Utah 84058 00230 
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DATED til i s "^  day of / - ^ 6 /u a K ^ 1993 . 
\Johrl\A. Rok ich , Judge 
C^K t ^ i < 
I hereby certify tnai. ^ n the day of January, 1993, T r\, 
\ true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Order an 
Defendant, 448 East 6400 South, Suite ,L4, Murray, Utah 84107. 
c:i I vo r c e \ d e q r a u w e,. o r d 
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McCullough, Jones, 
& ivins 
930 South State St 
) Suite 10 
Orern, Utah 84058 
IIO'^'J 
Weekends: 
Midweek: 
Hoiidays: 
Reasonable visitation should be defined as the parents may agree, 
they are not able to agree, reasonable visitation will routinely be 
ned for school-age (beginning kindergarten) children as follows: 
Alternate Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m. 
alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
(A) Christmas - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and 
continuting through 1/2 of the child's total 
Christmas school vacation. 
(B) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent 
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1990, 92, 
94, etc.); Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 
6 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m. Non-custodial 
parent to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 
95, etc.); Easter holiday is Friday G p.m. 
until Sunday G p.m. 
(C) Other holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, Presidents" Day, Memorial Day, July 
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. Those are to 
be alternated, with the non-custodial parent 
to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until G p.m. on the holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation 
arid no change^ should be Trade to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule. 
I at Mors/ Day- as appropriate G p.m. the day before until G p.m. 
Mot_hers' Day_:_ the day of. 
Birthdays: one evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the 
week of the child's birthday and the non-custodial 
parent's birthday. 
Extended-
Vis j t a t i o n: (A) Summer - 4 weeks continuous, with written notice 
of dates provided to custodial parent by May 
1st. Custodial parent to have alternate 
weekends, holiday, and phone visitation. 
(B) Year-Round school - two 2 week periods, with 
written notice of dates to custodial parent at 
least 30 days prior to visitation. Custodial 
parent to have holiday, and phone visitation. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year 
uninterrupted possession of the children for 
purposes of vacation, provided the same does not 
not interfere with holiday visitation per above. 
Each parent shall notify the other in writing of 
such two week period at least 30 days in advance. 
Telephone: reasonable, before 8 p.m. 
Other times as agreed. 
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